Abstract:

Considerable progress has been made over the past decade in ourunderstanding of the neural basis of logical reasoning.Unsurprisingly these data are telling us that the brain is organizedin ways not anticipated by cognitive theory. In particular, they're forcing us to confront the possibility that there may be no unitaryreasoning system in the brain (be it mental models or mental logic).Rather, the evidence points to a fractionated system that is dynamically configured in response to certain task and environmentalcues.  I will review three lines of demarcation including (a) systemsfor heuristic and formal processes (with evidence for some degree of content specificity in the heuristic system), (b) conflictdetection/resolution systems, and (c) systems for dealing withcertain and uncertain inferences; and then offer a tentative account of how the systems might interact to facilitate logical reasoning.Sensitivity to data generated by neuroimaging and patientmethodologies will move us beyond the sterility of mental models vs.mental logic debate and further the development of cognitive theories of reasoning.