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Principles and technology of biologically based cognitive architectures: Perceptual inference and learning. By Karl J. Friston
09/11/2008 - 09:45
09/11/2008 - 10:30
By Karl J. Friston
Abstract
This talk summarizes our recent attempts to integrate action and perception within a single optimization framework. We start with a statistical formulation of Helmholtz’s ideas about neural energy to furnish a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain’s organization and responses.
Here, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one aspect of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimize free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception respectively and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment and that its actions suppress surprising exchanges with it. Furthermore, it suggests that free-energy, surprise and [negative] value are all the same thing. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimization of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure.
Professor Karl J. Friston MB, BS, MA, MRCPsych, FMed.Sci, FRS
Wellcome Principal Fellow
Scientific Director: The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging
Institute of Neurology, UCL
12 Queen Square
London. WC1N 3BG UK
<k.friston [at] fil [dot] ion [dot] ucl [dot] ac [dot] uk>
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
Tel: 44 (0) 207 833 7457
Fax: 44 (0) 207 813 1445
This talk summarizes our recent attempts to integrate action and perception within a single optimization framework. We start with a statistical formulation of Helmholtz’s ideas about neural energy to furnish a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain’s organization and responses.
Here, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one aspect of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimize free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception respectively and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment and that its actions suppress surprising exchanges with it. Furthermore, it suggests that free-energy, surprise and [negative] value are all the same thing. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimization of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure.
Professor Karl J. Friston MB, BS, MA, MRCPsych, FMed.Sci, FRS
Wellcome Principal Fellow
Scientific Director: The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging
Institute of Neurology, UCL
12 Queen Square
London. WC1N 3BG UK
<k.friston [at] fil [dot] ion [dot] ucl [dot] ac [dot] uk>
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
Tel: 44 (0) 207 833 7457
Fax: 44 (0) 207 813 1445
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